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Abstract 
 In this paper, we examine global trajectories, dynamics, and tendencies of software 
piracy to ease the benchmarking of current efforts towards harmonizing the standards and 
enforcements of Intellectual Property Rights (henceforth IPRs) protection worldwide. Our 
empirical exercise is based on 15 different panel regressions, which together consists of 99 
countries. The richness of the dataset allows us to disaggregate countries into fundamental 
characteristics of business software piracy based on income-levels (high-income, lower-middle-
income, upper-middle-income and low-income), legal-origins (English common-law, French 
civil-law, German civil-law and, Scandinavian civil-law) and, regional proximity (South Asia, 
Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & the Pacific, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & 
the Caribbean and, Sub-Saharan Africa). Our main finding suggest  that, a genuine timeframe for 
standardizing IPRs laws in the fight against software piracy is most feasible within a horizon of 
4.3 to 10.4 years. In other words, full (100%) convergence within the specified timeframe will 
mean the enforcements of IPRs regimes without distinction of nationality or locality within 
identified fundamental characteristics of software piracy. The absence of convergence (in 
absolute and conditional terms) for the World panel indicates that, blanket policies may not be 
effective unless they are contingent on the prevailing trajectories, dynamics and tendencies of 
software piracy. Policy implications and caveats are also discussed.  
JEL Classification: F42; K42; O34; O38; O57 
Keywords: Piracy; Business Software; Software piracy; Intellectual Property Rights; Panel data; 
Convergence  
 
 
                         
1
 Simplice A. Asongu is lead economist in the Research Department of the AGDI (asongus@afridev.org).  
 3 
1.  Introduction 
 
 Although piracy of software on personal computers (henceforth PC) declined in many 
countries a few years ago, fast growing PC makers in some of the world’s highest piracy nations 
have caused the overall numbers to worsen (BSA
2
, 2007). With dollar losses from piracy rising 
by $8 billion to nearly $48 billion, the trend is expected to soar exponentially if urgent action is 
not taken (Andrés & Asongu, 2013)
3
.  In recent history, there has been a wide consensus on the 
key role that intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection play in the promotion of innovations 
and economic growth (Andrés & Asongu, 2013). This has made it abundantly clear that, for any 
country, region or continent to be actively engaged in the global economy, it must be 
competitive. Competition derives from intellectual capital that is protected by IPRs laws. 
Unfortunately, innovation and technological progress have not only brought an increase 
availability of information and technology related products, but also the proliferation of 
technology used to copy and pirates such commodities (Asongu, 2013a).  In light of the pressing 
issues, efforts have been devoted to increasing and harmonizing the standard and enforcement of 
IPRs protection worldwide. Until much recently, the debate (centered on IPRs protection) has 
been focused on the pros and cons of IPRs, especially on developing countries
4
. However a 
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 Business Software Alliance.  
3
 The traditional point of view on piracy is that it is harmful. The mains argument is that potential consumers get to 
consume illegal products that are substitutes to the legal ones. The argument is based on the assumption that there is 
a significant displacement rate. Nevertheless, more recently  Waldfogel (2012) suggests that this assumption is not 
correct.  Substantial part of the products consumed illegally would simply not have been purchased in absence of 
piracy. Another study, reports that a certain level of piracy could have some positive effect (Lahiri and Dey, 2013). 
4
 “The debate has centered around IPRs protection, with some scholars postulating that increased protection of 
IPRs stimulates economic growth and development through the appealing impact on factor productivity (Gould & 
Gruben, 1996; Falvey et al., 2006). On the other hand, skeptics are of the position that IPRs protection and 
adherence to international treaties (laws) may seriously limit the growth prospects of developing countries (Yang & 
Maskus, 2001). This strand is of the view that, less tight IPRs regimes are necessary (at least in the short-term) for 
developing countries, to enable knowledge spillovers, imperative for growth and development. According to them, 
the existing technology in developing countries is more imitative and/or adaptive in nature and not suitable for the 
creation of new innovations”.  
 4 
novel strand has emerged that cuts adrift the debate and focuses on the feasibility of and 
timeframe for adopting common policies in the battle against software piracy.  
Cognizant of the above, this paper complements existing literature on IPRs 
harmonization against software piracy from four standpoints: current disturbing evidence on 
global software piracy; missing link in the literature; availability of a richer new dataset to 
extend the theoretical underpinnings of Asongu (2013a) and; assessment of certain findings 
within a global framework. Firstly, evidence on global levels in software piracy are deserving of 
examination (BSA, 2007). Hence, this paper in partial response to highlighted concerns will 
attempt to provide global benchmarks for policy harmonization, with particular emphasis on the 
‘feasibility of’ and ‘ideal timeframe for’ common policies against software piracy. Secondly, as 
far as we have reviewed, the absence of studies that have addressed the concern of policy 
harmonization represents an important missing link in the software piracy literature. The present 
paper is therefore in view of filling this scholarly gap. Thirdly, availability of a broader dataset 
provides two unique opportunities: on the one hand, it provides ample degrees of freedom to 
investigate the scourge of software piracy that has not received the much needed scholarly focus 
owing to the absence of relevant data and; on the other hand, it provides room for the extension 
of previous literature from an African to a global platform. Accordingly, the richness of the 
dataset in appealing time series properties enables the current paper to steer clear of previous 
empirical literature from four critical standpoints: the period of study is 1994-2010 instead of 
2000-2010; 99 countries make-up the dataset as opposed to 11 countries in the pioneering study; 
3 categorization criteria based on legal origins, income-levels and, regional proximity are 
employed contrary to an exclusive (but non arbitrary)
5
 usage of only legal origin as the 
segmentation criterion in the formal literature; instead of 3 fundamental characteristics of 
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 The unique segmentation based on legal origin is due to constraints in degrees of freedom.   
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software piracy used in the pioneering study, the richness of our dataset has given room for the 
derivation of 15 fundamental characteristics of software piracy. Fourthly, the use of a global 
dataset also presents the opportunity of empirically assessing the impact of legal origins on 
software piracy. The imperative of this assessment is twofold: on the one hand, the 6 English 
common-law (5 French civil-law) countries on which previous findings are based are extended to 
27 (50) countries and; on the other hand, German civil-law and Scandinavian civil-law are 
included in the investigation to enrich the comparative analysis of legal origins.  
In light of the above foundations, upholding blanket IPRs policies in the battle against 
software piracy may not be effective unless they are contingent on fundamental characteristics 
and prevailing global trajectories, dynamics and tendencies of software piracy. Hence, policy 
makers are most likely to ask the following three questions before considering the harmonization 
of IPRs policies on software piracy. (1) Is software piracy converging globally? (2) If so, what is 
the degree and timing of the convergence process? (3) For which relevant fundamental 
characteristics of software piracy do answers to the first and second questions apply? While an 
answer to the first question will guide on the feasibility of harmonizing blanket policies, the 
answer to the second will guide on an optimal timeframe for such blanket policies.  Ultimately, 
the answer to the third (given that the first and second questions are already answered), will 
determine the feasibility-of, timeframe-for and exclusiveness (or non arbitrariness) of the 
common IPRs policies. This third question is most relevant because, it underscores the need for 
common policies to be contingent on the prevailing speeds of and time for full (100%) 
convergence within each identified fundamental characteristic of software piracy. 
Harmonization here refers to the adjustment of inconsistencies and differences among 
different procedures, specifications, systems or methods to make them mutually compatible or 
 6 
uniform in fighting software piracy (Asongu, 2013a). Convergence refers to the elimination of 
cross-country dispersions in the rate of business software piracy. In other words, it implies, the 
cross-country differences in the use of pirated software is reducing. In the same vein, full 
convergence means that the elimination of cross-country differences in software piracy is 
complete such that, countries within a homogenous panel have become indifferent in terms of 
software piracy. The link between convergence and harmonization is based on the fact that, with 
the former, countries with lower rates of software piracy are catching-up their counterparts with 
higher rates. Hence, the problem is getting worse. With full convergence, common policies can 
be harmonized without distinction of nationality because countries within a homogenous panel 
are now indifferent in terms of software piracy rates.  
Our findings show that a genuine timeframe for the standardization of IPRs laws in the 
battle against the piracy of software is most feasible within a horizon of 4.3 to 10.4 years. This 
implies, with 100% or full convergence during this specified timeframe, the harmonization of 
IPRs is optimal. In other words, the enforcement of IPRs regimes without distinction of 
nationality is optimal among countries within sampled fundamental characteristics. The findings 
also show an absence of convergence in the World panel. An indication that blanket policies may 
not be effective. Hence, policy measures should be based on the prevailing dynamics, trajectories 
and tendencies of software piracy.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature. Data 
and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis and 
discussion of results are covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Motivation, literature and scope  
 
2.1 Motivation 
 
The intuition motivating this paper is typically consistent with the evidence of per capita 
income convergence across countries which has been examined in the context of neoclassical 
growth models, originally developed by the pioneering works of Baumol (1986), Barro  & Sala-
i-Martin (1992, 1995) and Mankiw et al. (1992). The theoretical underpinnings of income 
convergence are abundant in the empirical growth literature (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) and have 
recently been applied in other areas of economic development (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 
2012; Asongu, 2012a). While there is a theory and vast empirical work on per capita income 
convergence, there is yet not a theory on convergence in other development areas, e.g financial 
markets, knowledge economy (KE), Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)...etc. However, there is 
increasing application of convergence underpinnings to IPRs harmonization (Asongu, 2013a), 
financial markets (Bruno et al., 2012; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013b, 2014a) and, 
optimality of currency areas (Asongu, 2013c, 2014b). Cognizant of these recent empirical 
developments, aware of the risks of ‘doing measurement without theory’; we argue that, 
reporting facts even without the presence of a formal theoretical model is a useful scientific 
activity. Therefore, we are consistent with recent literature (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan et 
al., 2011; Asongu, 2013a) in the assertion that, applied econometrics has other tasks than the 
mere validation or refutation of economic theories. 
 The intuition underpinning the linkage between software piracy and harmonization of 
policies within a homogenous panel (or fundamental characteristic) is twofold: (1) convergence 
in the software piracy rate will imply that, the adoption of common policies to combat the 
scourge is feasible and; (2) full (100%) convergence will mean, the enforcement of these policies 
 8 
without distinction of nationality or locality. This intuition is consistent with very recent 
methodological insights into IPRs harmonization against software piracy (Asongu, 2013a). Since 
it is unlikely to find convergence within a very heterogeneous set of countries, the original 
sample is splitted into fundamental characteristics of software piracy based on income-levels, 
legal origins, and regional proximity. We provide justification for this segmentation in the data 
section. The segmentation consists of fundamental characteristics that determined absolute 
convergence. The intuition behind conditional convergence is that, if there are cross-country 
differences in macroeconomic and institutional characteristics that determine the rate of software 
piracy, it is possible for countries with a lower rate of software piracy to catch-up their 
counterparts with higher levels of software piracy. These macroeconomic and institutional 
characteristics that determine the scourge include, among others: economic prosperity, rule of 
law, Research & Development (R&D), internet penetration, population growth, life expectancy, 
financial development and, main IPR laws (Constitution, Main IP law, WIPO, Multilateral and 
Bilateral)
6
. 
 
2.2 Scope, positioning and testable hypotheses  
 
2. 2. 1 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and development  
 
 We devote space to emphasizing the relation between IPRs and development largely 
borrowed from Asongu (2013a). Consistent with Bezmen & Depken (2004), there are two main 
avenues along which intellectual property (IP) and the strength of IPRs regimes are thought to 
influence the level of economic growth and development. The first strand emphasizes the extent 
to which IPRs influence the creation of new knowledge and information within nations, as well 
as the diffusion of existing knowledge across countries. The second strand concentrates on the 
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indirect effect of a nation’s IPRs regime on international transactions that provide factors 
imperative to the growth process.  
 In the first strand that deals with the ‘creation and dissemination of information’, IPRs 
protection could be traced to the foundation of endogenous theories of economic growth 
whereby, investment in R&D rewards individual investors with profit (returns) and also increase 
society’s stock of knowledge. Lowering the cost of future innovation is appealing to the 
accumulation of knowledge for economic growth (Romer, 1990; Grossman & Helpman, 1991). 
The underlying wisdom of strict and tight IPRs is based on the notion that, protection of IPRs 
serves as a stimulus to growth by encouraging innovations and inventions. Recently, many newly 
industrialized countries have pushed for tighter IPRs through bilateral, multilateral and regional 
arrangements. This difference in strategy could be traced to the interest of developing countries 
to specialize in labor intensive production in agricultural industries. These industries, until much 
recently have largely been supported by public budgets on research and technology and have 
also greatly benefited from shared knowledge spillovers.  
 In the second strand, borrowing from Asongu (2013a), IPRs also have the tendency to 
affect a nation’s growth and development process through their influence on a nation’s ability to 
engage in international transactions such as trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows and 
technology transfers (Bezmen & Depken, 2004). International trade has been presented by 
endogenous growth theories as an important stimulus to economic prosperity, as access to world 
markets could spur greater utilization of human resources (Todaro & Smith, 2003), and facilitate 
the transmission of technology by providing contact with foreign counterparts and direction of 
domestic resources towards more research intensive sectors. Nevertheless, these models do not 
necessarily foresee that openness engenders economic growth for all countries and under all 
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circumstances; principally because, theoretical prediction depends on country-specific 
conditions. It has also been substantially documented that, a stronger IPRs regime is a crucial 
factor in attracting the inflows of FDI and technological transfers (Lee & Mansfield, 1996), 
stimulating exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) and, increasing the likelihood of investment 
undertaken by multinational enterprises (Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 1996). On the other hand, 
stronger IPRs protection could mitigate the need for FDI (Yang & Maskus, 2001).  
 
2.2.2 Scope and positioning of the paper  
 
 Consistent with Asongu (2013a), a great bulk of the empirical literature has examined the 
determinants of the willingness to pirate software by assessing the socio-economic factors that 
affect piracy. Solid findings have been established that nations with higher income and greater 
individualism have lower piracy rates (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Park 
& Ginarte, 1997; Rushing & Thompson, 1996, 1999; Husted, 2000; Marron & Steel, 2000; 
Kranenberg & Hogenbirk, 2003; Kim, 2004; Depken & Simmons, 2004). A substantial bulk of 
empirical literature has also focused on the socio-economic determinants of piracy rates in 
several copyright industries (Andrés, 2006; Banerjee et al., 2005; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; 
Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Andrés & Goel, 2012).  
 At the advent of globalization with recent developments in Information & 
Communication Technologies (ICTs), the concern over software piracy has retained scholarly 
attention. International organizations are currently advocating global convergence in IPRs as a 
necessary condition for successful innovation strategies. The difficulties of achieving such 
harmonization are however obvious from the attempts of several nations to develop divergent 
IPRs systems. Therefore, IPRs are growingly involved in standard-setting activities. In light of 
the pressing issues, efforts have been devoted to increasing and harmonizing the standard and 
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enforcement of IPRs protection worldwide. As emphasized in the introduction, until much 
recently, the debate centered on IPRs protection has been focused on the pros and cons of IPRs, 
especially on developing countries. However a novel strand has emerged that cuts adrift the 
debate and focuses on the feasibility of and timeframe for adopting common policies in the battle 
against software piracy (Asongu, 2013a). The present paper substantially complements Asongu 
(2013a) in the dimensions already covered in the introduction.  
 
2.2.3 Testable hypotheses  
 In light of the theoretical underpinnings discussed in Section 2.1, we are consistent with 
Bacharach (1989) in clearly articulating the testable hypotheses. Fundamentally, these testable 
hypotheses are based on two main questions. 
-First, is software piracy converging globally? The resulting hypothesis is that the issue of 
software piracy is getting worse globally because countries with low levels are converging or 
catching-up with nations of high levels in software piracy (Hypothesis 1). 
-If nations are converging in terms of software piracy, what is the degree and timing of the 
convergence processes? In other words, if Hypothesis 1 holds, then based on the stylized facts in 
the introduction, the rate of convergence is high or the timing to full convergence is fast 
(Hypothesis 2).  
 Whereas evidence of catch-up or convergence is used to assess Hypothesis 1, the rate of 
catch-up and time needed for full catch-up are used to address Hypothesis 2.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
 The data used in this study were obtained from several sources such as the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI), the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) and the BSA (2007) for the period 1994-2010. The limitation to 99 countries and the 17 
year annual periodicity is due to constraints in data availability on software piracy.  
 
3.1.1 Measuring piracy 
 
Consistent with SIIA (2000), software piracy is defined as “the unauthorized copying of 
computer software that constitutes copyright infringement for either commercial or personal 
use”. Owing to the fact that software piracy could potentially taking place in many avenues – 
e.g., organized copiers, piracy by individuals and commercial or business piracy, obtaining an 
accurate measure of the prevalence of software piracy remains a challenge in the literature. There 
are many types of piracy and with respect to the Business Software Alliance (BSA), we can 
distinguish among: 1) end user copying; 2) downloading; and 3) counterfeiting (Andrés & 
Asongu, 2013). The level of piracy is computed as the variation between the demand for new 
software applications (estimated from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software.  In the 
context of this study, the measure of piracy employed is the percentage of software (primarily 
business software) in a country that is illegally installed (without a license) annually and is taken 
to capture the level of software piracy. This variable is presented in percentages, scaling from 0 
% (no piracy) to 100 % (i.e., all software installed is pirated). The rate of software piracy is 
computed as: ‘logarithm of (piracy/(100-piracy))’ to ensure comparability of the variables. 
Piracy levels source from the Business Software Alliance (BSA, 2007). An exhaustive account 
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of the measurement could be obtained from BSA (2009)
7
. As far as we have reviewed, though 
the BSA is an industry group, its data on software piracy is the best cross-country measure 
currently available; though object of some inherent upward bias
8
.  In the current paper, we focus 
on end-user piracy where consumers will use the software at home, and software is not sold to 
the others (commercial piracy).  
 
3.1.2 Determination of fundamental characteristics 
 
We devote space to discussing the determination of fundamental characteristics. 
Consistent with the literature (Asongu, 2013a), it is unlikely to find convergence within a 
heterogeneous set of countries. Hence, the determination of characteristics that are fundamental 
to software piracy is crucial. Government quality (transparency, corruption, regulation quality 
…etc) and macroeconomic fundamental characteristics have the draw-back of being time-
dynamic. Therefore, the same threshold may not be consistent over time, especially on a horizon 
of over 17 years. We shall take a minimalistic approach and be consistent with recent literature 
(Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013b, 2014a) in determining fundamental characteristics based 
on: legal origins, income-levels and, regional proximity.  
 Firstly, the premise of legal origin as a fundamental characteristic of software piracy is 
based on: the emphasis legal origins place on private property rights vis-à-vis those of the state 
(La Porta et al., 1998); the empirical evidence on the link between legal origins and corruption 
(La Porta et al., 1999) and; recent comparative institutional literature on the weight of legal 
origins in the effect of IPRs on software piracy (Asongu, 2014c).  While English common-law 
                         
7
The BSA data measures the piracy of commercial software for the most part.  We are not knowledgeable of any 
publicly available cross-national data on end-user software piracy.  See Traphagan & Griffith (1998) and Png (2010) 
for a discussion on the reliability of piracy data.   
8
Among the many researchers that have used this data are: Marron & Steel (2000), Banerjee et al. (2005), Andrés 
(2006), Goel & Nelson (2009) and, Asongu (2013a).  
 
 14 
countries place more emphasis on private property rights (or IPRs), French civil-law focuses 
more on state power.  In essence, the underlying logic for this segmentation is that, the 
institutional web of informal norms, formal rules and enforcement characteristics affect software 
piracy (Asongu, 2013a). We also include German civil-law and Scandinavian civil-law countries 
as in La Porta et al. (1998) in order to obtain results with broader policy implications.   
 Secondly, assessing software piracy trajectories with income-level dynamics could also 
provide relevant policy implications. Beside sound justification from empirical underpinnings of 
the convergence literature (Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013b, 2014a), piracy has been 
documented to be associated with wealth (Moores & Esichaikul, 2011). Intuitively, the 
foundation for this segmentation criterion is solid because many engage in software piracy 
because they do not have money to buy the right thing (Asongu, 2014c). Also, deep-rooted 
findings have been established that nations with higher income and greater individualism have 
lower piracy rates (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Park & Ginarte, 1997; 
Rushing & Thompson, 1996, 1999; Gopal & Sanders 1998; Gopal & Sanders 2000; Husted, 
2000; Marron & Steel, 2000; Kranenburg & Hogenbirk, 2003; Kim, 2004; Depken & Simmons, 
2004; Andrés, 2006; Driouchi et al. 2014). The income-levels include: High-income, Upper-
middle-income, Lower-middle-income and, Low-income.  
 Thirdly, regional proximity is an important premise for studying convergence, especially 
from a global perspective (Narayan et al., 2011). According to the BSA (2011), a number of 
factors contribute to regional differences in piracy: the strength of the IPRs, the availability of 
pirated software and cultural variations. More so, piracy is not uniform within a country; it varies 
from city to city, industry to industry and demographic to demography. Hence, it could therefore 
be argued that, piracy networks may not only be local but regional as well. These regions 
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include: South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & the Pacific, Middle East & North 
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and, Latin America & the Caribbean.  
 
3.1.3 Choice of control variables 
 
 The choice of control variables is contingent on the theoretical underpinnings of 
conditional convergence which state that, if countries differ in macroeconomic and institutional 
characteristics that determine software piracy then, it is possible for conditional convergence to 
take place. 12 control variables are employed in two different specifications to control for 
macroeconomic and institutional determinants of software piracy. These include: economic 
prosperity, rule of law, R&D, internet penetration, population growth, life expectancy, financial 
development and IPR laws (Constitution, Main IP law, WIPO, Multilateral and Bilateral)
9
. 
Accordingly, we intuitively expect economic prosperity to mitigate piracy because as the wealth 
of nation increase, citizens have the money to buy the right thing, assuming income is evenly 
distributed. The rule of law and IPRs laws are naturally expected to have a negative incidence on 
piracy (Asongu, 2014c). Previous empirical studies suggested that there is a significant link 
between the legal framework proxied by the rule of law, international treaties and software 
piracy (Holm 2003; Van Kranenburg and Hogenbirk 2005; Andrés 2006; Baghci et al. 2006; Ki 
et al. 2006: Driouchi et al. 2014).  
 
Internet penetration should have a positive effect on piracy (Asongu, 2013a). Large sums of 
money owing to financial development have been documented to be associated with software 
piracy (Moores & Esichaikul, 2011, p.1). However from intuition, the effect of money supply on 
software piracy should depend (for the most part) on the income-strata of the population that 
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accounts for the high money velocity
10
. Positive demographic change and life expectancy should 
naturally increase the percentage of the population tempted to pirate software. Ultimately the 
economic, institutional and technological factors employed as control variables are broadly 
consistent with Andrés & Goel (2011, pp. 7-8). 
Summary statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation analysis (showing the 
basic correlations between key variables used in this paper) and variable definitions (with 
corresponding data sources) are displayed in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 
respectively. The descriptive statistics of the variables show that, there is quite a degree of 
variation in the data utilized so that one should be comfortable and confident that reasonable 
estimated relationships would emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate issues 
of overparameterization and multicollinearity.  Based the correlation coefficients, there do not 
appear to be any major issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
First, panel data regression models were run where the rate of software piracy was 
regressed on a set of explanatory variables chosen according to previous studies. In the second 
part of the paper, a neoclassical convergence analysis was conducted. Following Asongu 
(2013a), the estimation approach is based on one the traditional convergence models, the beta 
convergence (or absolute convergence) due to constraints in the data set. The use of 
cointegration and unit roots tests are not convenient owing of limited degrees of freedom in 
homogenous panels or fundamental characteristics. Additionally, the alternative stance of 
convergence (sigma-convergence) which is of the view that, a group of economies converge 
when the cross-section variance of the variable under consideration declines, is also 
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 Piracy is strongly link to poverty: faction of the population with low income. A position that is valid from 
economic and cultural considerations (Moores & Esichaikul, 2011, p.1).  
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inappropriate because the data structure of the study is a panel dataset. This type of convergence 
occurs  when dispersions in software piracy fall over time. Our estimation procedure typically 
follows the evidence of income convergence across countries that have been investigated in the 
context of pioneering works in neoclassical growth models (Baumol, 1986; Barro & Sala-i-
Martin, 1992, 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992).  
In line with the convergence literature (Fung, 2009, p. 3; Asongu, 2013a), the two 
equations below are the standard approaches in the literature for investigating conditional 
convergence if tiW ,  is taken as strictly exogenous.  
titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln(        
   (1) 
tititititi WYY ,,,, )ln()ln(                           (2)
 
 Where tiY ,  is the proxy for the rate of piracy in country i at period t. σ = 1+ β. tiW ,  is a vector of 
determinants of piracy,  i  is a country-specific effect,  t  is a time-specific constant and  ti , is 
the classical error term. According to the neo-classical growth model, a statistically significant 
negative coefficient on   in Eq. (1) suggests that, countries relatively close to their steady state 
in ‘piracy-rate growth’ will experience a slowdown in the growth of piracy, known as 
conditional convergence (Narayan et al., 2011, p. 2). In the same line of thinking, according to 
Fung (2009, p. 3) and recent African convergence literature (Asongu, 2013ab), if  10    in 
Eq. (2), then  tiY ,  is dynamically stable around the path with a trend piracy rate the same as that 
of  tW , and with a height relative to the level of tW .  The variables incorporated in tiW ,  and the 
individual effect i  are measures of the long-term level the software piracy market is converging 
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to. Hence, the country-specific effect i  emphasizes other determinants of a country’s steady 
state not captured by tiW , . 
 Conditions for convergence outlined above are valid if and only if, tiW ,  exhibits strict 
exogeneity. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the real world because, while economic 
prosperity, rule of law, R&D, internet penetration, population growth, life expectancy, financial 
development and IPR laws (components of tiW , ) influence piracy rate, the reverse effect is also 
true. Hence, we are faced with the issue of endogeneity in which control variables ( tiW , ) are 
correlated with the error term ( ti , ). Moreover, country- and time-specific effects could be 
correlated with other variables in the model, which is very probable with lagged dependent 
variables included in the equations. This issue of endogeneity has been substantially documented 
in the piracy literature (Ginarte & Park, 1997; Bezmen & Depken, 2004)
11
. A means of tackling 
the problem of the correlation between the individual specific-effect and the lagged dependent 
variables consists of eliminating the individual effect by first differencing. Thus Eq. (2) 
becomes: 
)()()ln()ln()ln( ,,2,,2,,,,     titititititititi WWYYYY
                 (3) 
However Eq. (3) presents another issue; estimates by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) are 
still biased because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent 
variable and the disturbance term. To tackle this concern, we estimate the regression in 
differences jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized Method of Moments 
                         
11
As emphasized by Bezmen & Depken (2004), papers investigating the piracy-development nexus are subject to 
potential endogeneity problems, because it is likely that a nation’s level of development is a crucial factor in its 
choice of or adherence to a particular IPRs regime. This confirms an earlier stance by Ginarte & Park (1997) who 
found strong evidence that the level of economic development explains the strength of patent protection provided by 
individual countries.  
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(henceforth, GMM) estimation. In practice, Hansen (1982) showed that all instrumental variables 
estimators can be interpreted as GMM estimators.  The most important step in applying GMM is 
to find good instruments (instruments are valid and strong). Arellano & Bond (1991) has 
suggested an application of the GGMM that exploits all the orthogonality conditions between the 
lagged dependent variables and the error term. The process employs lagged levels of the 
regressors as instruments in the difference equation, and lagged differences of the regressors as 
instruments in the levels equation, therefore exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between 
the lagged dependent variables and the error term. Between the difference GMM estimator 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991) and system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & 
Bond, 1998), we opt for the latter in accordance with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4)
12
.  
The GMM estimation approach has been substantially applied in the convergence 
literature. Consistent with Asongu (2013a), as opposed to Narayan et al. (2011), we shall adopt 
Fung (2009) owing to software specificities
13
. In model specification, we choose the two-step 
GMM because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity
14
. The hypothesis of no auto-
correlation in the residuals is crucial as lagged variables are to be used as instruments for the 
dependent variables. Accordingly, the estimation depends on the assumption that the lagged 
values of the dependent variable and other independent variables are valid instruments in the 
regression. When the error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order 
                         
12
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the initial 
conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been shown to 
perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially consistent with 
standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical application. 
Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth research”. 
Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4).  
 
13
 While Narayan et al. (2011) have used Eq. (1) in the absence of fixed effects, this paper employs Eqs. (2) and (3) 
instead; in line with Fung (2009). The Fung (2009) approach has been used in recent African convergence literature 
(Asongu, 2013ab).  
14
 In the one-step approach, the residuals are assumed to be homoscedastic.  
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auto-correlation of the differenced residuals should be significant whereas their second-order 
auto-correlation should not be. The validity of the instruments is examined with the Sargan over-
identifying restrictions (OIR) test.  
 In accordance with Islam (1995, p. 14),  yearly time spans are too short to be appropriate 
for studying convergence, as short-run disturbances may loom substantially in such brief time 
spans. Therefore, considering the data span of 17 years, we are consistent with Asongu (2013a) 
in using two-year non-overlapping intervals (NOI)
15
.  This implies in our analysis, τ is set to 2. 
We also compute the implied rate of convergence by calculating σ/2. Accordingly, the estimated 
coefficient of the lagged differenced endogenous variable is divided by 2 because we have used a 
two year interval to absorb the short-term disturbances. When the absolute value of the estimated 
autoregressive coefficient is greater than zero but less than one ( 10   ), we establish 
evidence of convergence. The broader interpretation suggests, past variations have less 
proportionate impact on future differences, implying the variation on the left hand side of Eq. (3) 
is decreasing overtime as the country is converging to a steady state (Asongu, 2013ab).  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 Presentation of results 
  
This section looks at three principal concerns: (1) investigation of the presence of 
convergence; (2) computation of the speed of convergence and; (3) determination of the time 
needed for full (100%) convergence. The summary of overall findings is presented in Table 1 in 
which, the three issues are addressed. Results for absolute (unconditional) and conditional 
convergence are reported in Table 2 and Tables 3-4 respectively.  
                         
15
 We have 9 two-year non-overlapping intervals: 1994; 1995-1996; 1997-1998; 1999-2000; 2001-2002; 2003-2004; 
2005-2006; 2007-2008; 2009-2010. Owing to data and periodical constraints, the first interval is short of one year.  
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Whereas, absolute convergence is estimated with just the lagged difference of the 
endogenous variable as independent variable, conditional convergence is with respect to Eqs. (2) 
and (3) in the presence of control variables. Hence, unconditional convergence is estimated in 
the absence of tiW , : vector of determinants (economic prosperity, rule of law, R&D, internet 
penetration, population growth, life expectancy, financial development and IPR laws) of 
software piracy. In order to assess the validity of the model and indeed the convergence 
hypothesis, we perform two tests, notably the Sargan-test which examines the over-identification 
restrictions and, the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which assesses the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Sargan-test investigates if the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis is the stance that, the 
instruments as a group are strictly exogenous (do not suffer from endogeneity), that is needed for 
the validity of the GMM estimates. The p-values of estimated coefficients are reported in 
brackets in the line following the reported values of the estimated coefficients. With the 
exception of World panel findings (last columns of Tables 2-4), we notice that the Sargan-test 
statistics often appear with a p-value greater than 0.10, hence its null hypothesis is not rejected in 
all the regressions. We report both the first and second order correlation tests, but give priority to 
the second order autocorrelation: AR (2) test in first difference because it is more relevant than 
AR (1) as it detects autocorrelation in levels. For majority of estimated models, we are unable to 
reject the AR (2) null hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation, especially for conditional 
convergence specifications. For a few exceptions, we take a minimalistic approach of 
considering models with a AR (2) test result of 10% significance as moderately efficient because 
the arguments against the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation are moderately weak. Hence, 
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there is robust evidence that most of the models are deficient of autocorrelation at the 1% and 
5% significance levels. 
A summary of the results from Tables 2-4 is reported in Table 1. This includes results for 
Absolute Convergence (AC), Conditional Convergence (CC), the Speed of Absolute 
Convergence (SAC), the Speed of Conditional Convergence (SCC) and the rate required to 
achieve full (100%) convergence in both types of convergences.  
From a general standpoint, the following conclusions could be drawn. (1) While there is a 
significant evidence of the absence of convergence (both in absolute and conditional terms) in 
the World panel, there is substantial evidence of convergence within fundamental characteristics. 
(2)  Absolute convergence is consistent across fundamental characteristics within the horizon of 
4-6 years. (3) Conditional convergence is averagely within 4.4-10.4 (4.6-8.2) years (yrs) for 
Specification 1 (Specification 2). (4) Income-levels matter in the convergence process, especially 
in CC. While AC increases with the importance of a positive wealth-effect (5yrs, 5.19yrs and 
5.71 yrs for Lower-middle-income, Upper-middle-income and High-income respectively), there 
is evidence of a U-shape in CC with corresponding years to convergence of 10.38, 5.19 and 7.14 
(Specification 1) and 6.28, 5.97 and 6.15 (Specification 2) as we move from Lower-middle-
income to Higher-income countries, passing through Upper-middle-income countries 
respectively. (5) Legal origins also count in the convergence process. Firstly, while no evidence 
of CC is found in German and Scandinavian civil-law countries, the timeframe in French civil-
law countries is slightly higher than that in their English common-law counterparts with 
corresponding ‘rates of’ (and time to full) convergence of 38% per annum (5.26yrs) and 34.5% 
per annum (5.79yrs) respectively. Secondly for CC, while the results of French civil-law 
countries are almost consistent across specifications, the convergence rate of German civil-law 
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countries decreases by about 2.4 years as one moves from the second to the third specification. 
Thirdly, while there is no CC for both specifications of Scandinavian countries and the second 
specification of English common-law countries, with respect to the first specification, English 
common-law countries have the highest CC rate (and time to full convergence) of 45% per 
annum (4.44 yrs). (5) Regional proximity also matters in the convergence processes. Firstly, 
while there is no evidence of AC in Europe & Central Asia, significant signs of this convergence 
are highest in South Asia and lowest in Latin America & the Caribbean with corresponding 
‘rates of’ (and time to full) convergence in increasing order: 37.5% per  annum (5.33 yrs) for 
Latin America & the Caribbean; 38% per annum (5.26 yrs) for the Middle East & North Africa; 
39% per annum (5.12 yrs) for East Asia & the Pacific; 42.5% per annum (4.7 yrs) for Sub-
Saharan Africa and; 46% per annum (4.34 yrs) for South Asia. Secondly, while CC findings 
differ more or less across specifications, a genuine timeframe for policy harmonization is within 
the horizon of 4.59-8.33 yrs.  
 Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs: (1) economic growth 
decreases piracy because as the wealth of nations increase, citizens have the money to buy the 
right commodity; (2) the rule of law mitigates the scourge, consistent with intuition; (3) 
Population growth increases piracy and; (4) IPRs laws consistently act as deterrents to the 
phenomenon for the most part.  
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Table 1: Summary of results on Absolute and Conditional Convergences 
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins Regions  
World  HI UMI LMI LI English French German Scandi SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LAC 
 Panel A: Absolute Convergence with Specifications in Table 2 
Absolute C (AC) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
% of A.C 35% 38.5% 40% n.a 34.5% 38% n.a n.a 46% n.a 39% 38% 42.5% 37.5% n.a 
Years to A.C  5.71Yrs 5.19Yrs 5Yrs n.a 5.79Yrs 5.26Yrs n.a n.a 4.34Yrs n.a 5.12Yrs 5.26Yrs 4.7Yrs 5.33Yrs n.a 
                
 Panel B: Conditional  Convergence with Specifications in Table 3 
Conditional C (CC) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
% of CC 28% 38.5% 19.25% n.a 45% 31% 24.5% n.a n.a 34.5% 24% 38.5% 37% 43.5% n.a 
Years to CC  7.14Yrs 5.19Yrs 10.38Yrs n.a 4.44Yrs 6.45Yrs 8.16Yrs n.a n.a 5.79Yrs 8.33Yrs 5.19Yrs 5.4Yrs 4.59Yrs n.a 
                
 Panel C: Conditional  Convergence with Specifications in Table 4 
Conditional C (CC) Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
% of CC 32.5% 33.5% 31.8% n.a n.a 33% 34.5% n.a n.a 43% 35.5% 39% 43% 24.5% n.a 
Years to CC  6.15Yrs 5.97Yrs 6.28Yrs n.a n.a 6.06Yrs 5.79Yrs n.a n.a 4.65Yrs 5.63Yrs 5.12Yrs 4.65Yrs 8.16Yrs n.a 
                
AC: Absolute Convergence. CC: Conditional Convergence.  Yrs: Years. HI: High Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. 
French: French Civil-law. German: German Civil-law. Scandi: Scandinavian Civil-law. SA: South Asia. ECA: Europe and Central Asia. EAP: East Asia and the Pacific. MENA: Middle East and North 
Africa. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
Table 2: Absolute Convergence  
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins Regions  
World  HI UMI LMI LI English French German Scandi SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LAC 
Initial  0.70*** 0.77*** 0.80*** -0.84 0.69*** 0.76*** 0.73*** 1.14*** 0.92*** 0.70*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 0.85*** 0.75*** 0.71*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.513) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(1) -2.8*** -2.30** -3.2*** 0.555 -2.7*** -3.8*** -1.483 -1.268 -0.366 -2.12** -1.818* -2.03** -1.348 -3.0*** -4.6*** 
 (0.000) (0.020) (0.001) (0.578) (0.006) (0.000) (0.137) (0.204) (0.714) (0.033) (0.069) (0.041) (0.177) (0.002) (0.000) 
AR(2) -0.543 -1.112 -1.658* -1.007 -0.782 -1.378 -2.02** 0.516 -0.957 -2.14** -1.676* -1.025 -1.639 1.495 -2.26** 
 (0.586) (0.265) (0.097) (0.313) (0.433) (0.168) (0.042) (0.605) (0.338) (0.032) (0.093) (0.305) (0.101) (0.134) (0.023) 
Sargan OIR 42.670 26.313 23.797 0.029 25.683 42.929 16.779 3.572 2.613 38.299 10.00 12.856 7.338 18.97 72.0*** 
 (0.146) (0.824) (0.904) (1.000) (0.846) (0.140) (0.994) (1.000) (1.000) (0.280) (1.000) (0.999) (1.000) (0.982) (0.000) 
Wald 244*** 713*** 1215*** 0.426 145*** 1466*** 124.8*** 9.91*** 8.77*** 296*** 142*** 191*** 36.1*** 852*** 851*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.513) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  44 29 24 2 27 50 18 4 3 43 11 13 8 19 99 
Observations 335 177 164 11 206 331 118 32 24 270 87 94 44 152 687 
                
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  NOI: 
Non overlapping intervals.  Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. HI: High Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English 
Common-law. French: French Civil-law. German: German Civil-law. Scandi: Scandinavian Civil-law. SA: South Asia. ECA: Europe and Central Asia. EAP: East Asia and the Pacific. MENA: Middle 
East and North Africa. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
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Table 3: Conditional Convergence (First Specification)  
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins Regions  
World  HI UMI LMI LI English French German Scandi SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LAC 
Initial  0.56*** 0.77*** 0.385** -4.074 0.90*** 0.62*** 0.49*** 0.525 -0.08 0.69*** -0.482 0.77*** 0.74** 0.85*** 0.70*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.379) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.173) (0.928) (0.000) (0.382) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  0.534 0.679 -0.34*** 2.883 0.637 -0.267 2.838** 13.60 0.408 0.652 0.809 0.45*** 0.575 -0.551** -0.070 
 (0.188) (0.812) (0.000) (0.272) (0.168) (0.117) (0.037) (0.218) (0.198) (0.198) (0.909) (0.008) (0.425) (0.014) (0.822) 
GDP  -0.120 -0.123 --- --- -0.116 -0.033 -0.630** -3.051 --- -0.194* -0.614 -0.11*** -0.139 -0.062 -0.041 
 (0.194) (0.845)   (0.157) (0.622) (0.024) (0.212)  (0.093) (0.603) (0.003) (0.420) (0.666) (0.515) 
R&D -0.03*** 0.110 0.063 --- 0.001 -0.020 0.020 --- --- -0.008 -0.161 --- --- 0.276 -0.05*** 
 (0.000) (0.314) (0.649)  (0.953) (0.660) (0.730)   (0.363) (0.516)   (0.392) (0.003) 
Internet  -0.030 0.016 -0.040 --- 0.064 -0.022 -0.037 --- --- -0.017 -0.16** --- --- 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.327) (0.816) (0.188)  (0.361) (0.372) (0.539)   (0.672) (0.038)   (0.940) (0.847) 
Population  0.018 -0.035 0.11*** --- -0.054 0.07** -0.006 --- --- 0.036 0.406 --- --- 0.075 0.049* 
 (0.500) (0.697) (0.000)  (0.345) (0.042) (0.941)   (0.363) (0.279)   (0.366) (0.068) 
Constitution  0.046 0.041 --- --- 0.050 -0.001 --- --- --- 0.030 --- --- --- -0.095 0.014 
 (0.049) (0.416)   (0.162) (0.974)    (0.187)    (0.410) (0.560) 
Main IP Law -0.006 -0.008 0.044 --- -0.005 0.005 -0.000 --- --- 0.004 -0.07*** --- --- -0.033 -0.007* 
 (0.109) (0.478) (0.334)  (0.543) (0.654) (0.984)   (0.356) (0.004)   (0.341) (0.082) 
IP_Law  -0.0005 -0.004 -0.005 --- 0.001 0.0008 -0.012 --- --- 0.002* 0.01*** --- --- -0.010* 0.001 
 (0.751) (0.599) (0.646)  (0.539) (0.889) (0.125)   (0.088) (0.006)   (0.068) (0.390) 
WIPO Treaties 0.005 0.034 --- --- 0.001 0.029** --- --- --- 0.018* --- --- --- 0.094** --- 
 (0.387) (0.141)   (0.864) (0.044)    (0.077)    (0.039)  
Multilateral  -0.004** -0.015* -0.012 --- -0.002 -0.01*** -0.002 --- --- -0.009** --- --- --- -0.019 -0.002* 
 (0.041) (0.098) (0.284)  (0.574) (0.000) (0.565)   (0.011)    (0.144) (0.093) 
Bilateral  -0.007** 0.019* -0.013 --- -0.003 0.003 0.0001 --- --- -0.002 --- --- --- 0.016 -0.004 
 (0.028) (0.087) (0.772)  (0.358) (0.826) (0.967)   (0.427)    (0.314) (0.448) 
                
AR(1) -2.301** -0.978 -1.729* 0.619 -1.723* -2.52** -0.686 -0.115 0.386 -1.684* 0.711 -2.10** -0.884 -2.13** -2.8*** 
 (0.021) (0.327) (0.083) (0.535) (0.084) (0.011) (0.492) (0.907) (0.698) (0.092) (0.476) (0.035) (0.376) (0.032) (0.004) 
AR(2) -1.619 -1.000 -0.929 -0.805 -1.376 -1.085 -1.138 1.101 -0.876 -1.477 -0.666 -1.169 -1.488 1.328 -2.24** 
 (0.105) (0.316) (0.352) (0.420) (0.168) (0.277) (0.255) (0.270) (0.380) (0.139) (0.505) (0.242) (0.136) (0.184) (0.024) 
Sargan OIR 23.721 11.642 9.307 0.000 10.455 26.899 6.427 1.031 1.347 24.649 0.437 9.615 6.717 11.829 43.90** 
 (0.591) (0.993) (0.999) (1.000) (0.997) (0.523) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.538) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.996) (0.028) 
Wald 3170*** 786.0*** 488*** 0.772 5977*** 846*** 11492*** 4.135 0.007 5241*** 8052*** 800*** 61.9*** 538*** 3787*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.379) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.126) (0.928) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  37 18 15 2 19 32 15 4 3 33 9 13 8 16 70 
Observations 229 104 67 11 112 171 91 32 24 200 55 88 44 78 400 
                
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. HI: High Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: 
French Civil-law. German: German Civil-law. Scandi: Scandinavian Civil-law. SA: South Asia. ECA: Europe and Central Asia. EAP: East Asia and the Pacific. MENA: Middle East and North Africa. 
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean. GDP: GDP per capita. R & D: Research and Development. IP: Intellectual Property. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization. 
Multilateral: Multilateral Treaties. Bilateral: Bilateral Treaties. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the 
null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
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Table 4: Conditional Convergence (Second Specification)  
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins Regions  
World  HI UMI LMI LI English French German Scandi SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LAC 
Initial  0.65*** 0.67*** 0.63*** -4.074 0.73*** 0.66*** 0.69*** -0.94 -0.08 0.86*** 0.71*** 0.78*** 0.86*** 0.49*** 0.68*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.379) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.379) (0.928) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.112 0.093 -0.526 2.883 1.259 2.07*** 0.639 3.340 0.408 -2.224 10.66* 4.692 0.017 5.917 0.880 
 (0.935) (0.943) (0.910) (0.272) (0.250) (0.000) (0.902) (0.129) (0.198) (0.199) (0.056) (0.349) (0.876) (0.553) (0.164) 
Rule of Law  -0.1*** -0.07*** 0.034 --- -0.07** -0.028 -0.073 -2.120 --- -0.031 0.067 -0.084 -0.050 -0.076 -0.07*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.712)  (0.041) (0.202) (0.119) (0.112)  (0.217) (0.367) (0.127) (0.160) (0.217) (0.001) 
Life Expectancy 0.200 0.277 0.229 --- -0.511 -1.09*** -0.241 --- --- 1.139 -5.965* -2.324 --- -2.572 -0.393 
 (0.786) (0.669) (0.914)  (0.359) (0.002) (0.932)   (0.218) (0.053) (0.361)  (0.616) (0.247) 
Money Supply   -0.020 0.008 -0.172 --- 0.056 -0.022 -0.026 --- --- -0.0001 0.063 --- --- -0.090 -0.0009 
 (0.112) (0.805) (0.279)  (0.127) (0.180) (0.778)   (0.992) (0.173)   (0.416) (0.968) 
Population  -0.017 -0.06** 0.061 --- -0.044* 0.009 -0.020 --- --- 0.013 --- -0.049 --- -0.145 -0.006 
 (0.315) (0.024) (0.563)  (0.085) (0.624) (0.610)   (0.478)  (0.226)  (0.102) (0.715) 
Constitution  -0.032 --- -0.002 --- 0.061 0.018 --- --- --- -0.027 --- --- --- 0.041 0.017 
 (0.278)  (0.980)  (0.149) (0.563)    (0.330)    (0.491) (0.488) 
Main IP Law -0.007 --- 0.015 --- -0.01*** 0.001 0.001 --- --- 0.002 --- --- --- 0.006 -0.008 
 (0.124)  (0.434)  (0.001) (0.829) (0.823)   (0.618)    (0.831) (0.155) 
IP_Law  0.003* -0.004** -0.013 --- 0.004*** -0.0007 -0.007 --- --- 0.002** --- --- --- -0.004 0.002 
 (0.066) (0.048) (0.231)  (0.004) (0.844) (0.508)   (0.046)    (0.497) (0.371) 
WIPO Treaties -0.001 --- --- --- 0.0002 0.016 --- --- --- 0.02*** --- --- --- --- 0.007 
 (0.854)    (0.981) (0.105)    (0.000)     (0.423) 
Multilateral  -0.003 -0.006* -0.007* --- 0.002 -0.008*** --- --- --- -0.01*** --- --- --- 0.004 -0.005** 
 (0.114) (0.091) (0.061)  (0.357) (0.004)    (0.001)    (0.680) (0.020) 
Bilateral  -0.003 0.02*** -0.004 --- -0.005* 0.007 --- --- --- -0.002** --- --- --- 0.028** -0.004 
 (0.294) (0.000) (0.938)  (0.068) (0.289)    (0.044)    (0.020) (0.146) 
                
AR(1) -2.5*** -1.775* -2.59*** 0.619 -2.066** -3.48*** -0.815 0.993 0.386 -1.871 -1.789* -2.14** -1.139 -2.8*** -3.58*** 
 (0.009) (0.075) (0.009) (0.535) (0.038) (0.000) (0.414) (0.320) (0.698) (0.061) (0.073) (0.032) (0.254) (0.004) (0.000) 
AR(2) -1.806* -0.775 -1.764* -0.805 -2.153** -1.118 -1.544 0.434 -0.876 -1.893* -1.386 -1.112 -1.556 0.740 -2.284** 
 (0.070) (0.438) (0.077) (0.420) (0.031) (0.263) (0.122) (0.663) (0.380) (0.058) (0.165) (0.266) (0.119) (0.459) (0.022) 
Sargan OIR 29.866 16.556 14.974 0.000 14.539 35.194 6.520 0.029 1.347 20.66 5.567 8.098 6.246 14.433 49.8*** 
 (0.273) (0.921) (0.957) (1.000) (0.965) (0.107) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.759) (1.000) (0.999) (1.000) (0.966) (0.003) 
Wald 3548*** 249*** 1064*** 0.772 4792*** 2035*** 980*** 6.160** 0.007 24941*** 1397*** 1022*** 77.9*** 623*** 2532*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.379) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.928) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  38 22 19 2 24 40 13 4 3 31 11 13 8 17 81 
Observations 235 135 117 11 149 243 78 32 24 189 76 81 44 119 496 
                
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. HI: High Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: 
French Civil-law. German: German Civil-law. Scandi: Scandinavian Civil-law. SA: South Asia. ECA: Europe and Central Asia. EAP: East Asia and the Pacific. MENA: Middle East and North Africa. 
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean. IP: Intellectual Property. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization. Multilateral: Multilateral Treaties. Bilateral: Bilateral 
Treaties. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
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4.2 Discussion of results policy implications and caveats 
 
4.2.1 Discussion and policy implications 
 
 It is interesting to understand the economic intuition motivating absolute and conditional 
convergence of software piracy before diving into the discussion of results. Absolute 
convergence in software piracy takes place when countries share similar fundamental 
characteristics with regard to the laws governing private IP such that, only variations across 
countries in initial levels of software piracy exist (Asongu, 2013a). Absolute convergence 
therefore results from factors such as: the formulation of laws protecting IPRs against software 
piracy within a legal system; wealth-effects (or income-levels) expressing how people do not 
have money to buy the right commodity; regional proximity, since cross-regional cultural 
difference significantly affects the availability of pirated software (BSA, 2011); among others. 
Absolute convergence also occurs because of adjustments common to the fundamental 
characteristics of piracy. Hence based on intuition, differences in initial conditions may 
significantly affect the process owing to: (1) the diffusion of legal cultures transmitted by 
colonial powers over time through regionalization and globalization such that, the legal origin 
fundamental holds less ground and; (2) non-uniformity of piracy within a country as well as 
variations from city to city, industry to industry and, demography to demography.  
 Conversely, conditional convergence is that which depends on structural and institutional 
characteristic that determine software piracy. It depicts the kind of convergence whereby, one’s 
own long-term steady state (equilibrium) is contingent on structural characteristics and 
fundamentals of its economy in general and ICT sector in particular. Hence, within a 
fundamental characteristic of piracy (say Low-income countries), cross-country differences in 
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factors that explain piracy could facilitate conditional convergence. Accordingly, in our models 
conditional convergence has been contingent on   macroeconomic and institutional 
characteristics that determined software piracy, notably: economic prosperity, rule of law, R&D, 
internet penetration, population growth, life expectancy, financial development and IPR laws. 
Hence, the findings are contingent on the variables we choose and empirically test. Owing to 
constraints in degrees of freedom, we have not been able to employ all components of the 
conditional information set in modeling the fundamental characteristics. As far as we have 
reviewed, this is not an issue because some models in the literature are not conditioned beyond 
two macroeconomic control variables (Bruno et al., 2012).  
 We have observed the following general findings. (1) There is no evidence of 
convergence (in absolute and conditional terms) for the World panel. This indicates that, blanket 
policies may not be effective unless they are contingent on the prevailing trajectories, dynamics 
and tendencies of software piracy. (2) Differences in absolute convergence rates and time 
required for full (100%) AC could be traced to disparities in initial conditions of software piracy. 
Hence, fundamental characteristics with lower (higher) rates (time) of (to full) convergence are 
the result of significant differences in initial conditions: the diffusion of legal cultures 
transmitted by colonial powers over time through regionalization and globalization such that, the 
legal origin fundamental holds less ground and; non-uniformity of piracy within a country as 
well as variations from city to city, industry to industry and, demography to demography. (3) 
From a CC perspective, variations across fundamental characteristics depend on cross-country 
differences in institutional and macroeconomic characteristics that determined software piracy. 
Accordingly, a higher (lower) rate of CC within a fundamental characteristic indicates lower 
(higher) differences in cross-country institutional and macroeconomic characteristics that 
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determine software piracy. (4) Regardless of fundamental characteristic, a feasible timeframe for 
the harmonization of policies in the fight against software piracy is within a horizon of 4.3 to 
10.4 years which is broadly consistent with the Asongu (2013a) finding of 4-8 years for the 
African continent. A broad interpretation indicates that, (both in absolute and conditional terms) 
countries with lower rates of software piracy are catching-up their counterparts with higher rates. 
Consistent with the intuition motivating this analysis on policy harmonization, two inferences 
could be made: on the one hand, convergence implies that, adopting common policies against the 
scourge is feasible and; full (100%) convergence within the specified time horizon reflects the 
implementation (or harmonization) of the feasible policies without distinction of nationality or 
locality within each fundamental characteristic.  
 It is also relevant to discuss a finding of Asongu (2013a) that has partially motivated this 
study. Asongu has established that: the argument that the institutional web of informal norms, 
formal rules and enforcement characteristics affect the quality of IPRs protection is not visible 
from a software piracy perspective. Our findings are inconsistent with this conclusion from a 
two-dimensional perspective: on the one hand, African countries on which the findings are based 
may have a higher degree of regional proximity whose weight (through regional corporations for 
example) could outweigh the incidence of legal cultures (which might have been diluted with 
time) and; on the other hand, we have used 21 (45) more English common-law (French civil-
law) countries from different global economic blocks.  
 We have shown that the issue of software piracy is getting worse across the globe and 
that urgent action is needed. The paper offers useful practical implications on the timing of 
feasible timeframes for the fight against software piracy. At the methodological level, it offers 
practical insight into the application of a reverse Solow-Swan methodology. Hence, the 
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contribution of the paper to the literature is not only in terms practical guidelines in the battle 
against software piracy.  The study has also offered a new approach on how to calibrate negative 
signals of economic activity.  
 
4.2.2 Caveats 
 
 Four main caveats have been retained: the absence of a theoretical basis, draw-backs in 
the methodology, limitations in the measurement of software piracy and, doubts about the ‘law 
and property rights theory’.  
 Firstly, using econometrics to engage in more than just testing theory is not without 
risks. The intuition premise of the study means, results should be interpreted with caution as the 
model is conditioned on the variables we choose and empirically test, which may not directly 
reflect all macroeconomic conditions on which ‘piracy convergence’ is endogenous.  We also 
leave for future research, a meta regression analysis (MRA) that can be used to identify the 
existence of publication bias in empirical studies on software piracy rates. This analysis can also 
provide us with new directions for future research.  
Secondly, as already emphasized in the first paragraph of Section 4.1, the choice of the 
convergence approach (which is based on constraints in data structure) also has its draw-backs. 
Borrowing from Apergis et al. (2008), critics of β-convergence argue that, if countries converge 
to a common equilibrium with identical internal structures, then the dispersion of the variable 
under consideration should disappear in the long-run as all countries converge to the same long-
run path. Moreover, if countries converge to ‘convergence clubs’ or to their own unique 
equilibrium, the dispersion of this measure will not approach zero (Miller & Upadhyay, 2002; 
Asongu, 2014d). Accordingly, in the latter case of country-specific equilibrium, the movements 
of the dispersion will depend on the initial distribution of the variable under investigation with 
 31 
regard to their final long-run outcomes. Overall, as emphasized by Caporale et al. (2009), the 
approach suffers from specific estimation deficiencies associated with the data structure. As 
justified by Asongu (2013a), piracy data is scarce and some of these issues can only be overcome 
with time.   
Thirdly, consistent with Asongu (2014c) the measurement of software piracy has relevant 
issues. (1) Piracy level in the study is computed as the difference in demand for new software 
applications (computed from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software. It is worth noting 
that, this metric defines piracy as the drop in demand of software products. Therefore, all pirated 
copies constitute lost sales. (2) It has been substantially documented that, those who purchase 
pirate copies don’t always have the money to buy the true commodity. Hence, to consider the use 
of pirated products as diminishing demand for originals could be some kind of overstatement. (3) 
The employment of the metric presupposes knowledge of the elasticity of demand for the 
original product. Otherwise, there will be a comparison of pirated commodities that constitutes 
loss in sales with ones that do not. Therefore, there is some upward bias in the software piracy 
estimate.  
 Fourthly, some doubts have been documented about the ‘law and property rights theory’, 
which postulates that British Common law supports innovation development to a greater extent 
than Civil law systems. The legal origins theory from which the underlying theory is based 
suggest that Common law systems (strong property rights, the role of the judiciary…etc) are 
more innovation-friendly than Civil law systems. Four points are important to retain here. (1) 
Some scholars have expressed doubts about whether the distinction between Common law and 
Civil law can be justified from an historical perspective (Deakin & Siems, 2010, p. 10). (2) 
Today, with regionalization and internationalization, modern trends make the Common law/Civil 
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law distinction even less persuasive. (3) It is not very clear why in essence we may expect 
differences in Common law and Civil law systems on the pure assumption that Common law 
tradition is characterized by independent judges and juries (relatively  weaker reliance on statutes 
and the preference for contracts and private litigation as a means of dealing with social harms), 
while Civil law tradition is characterized by state-employed judges, great reliance on legal and 
procedural codes, and a preference for state regulation over private regulation. (4) The 
categorization of countries into Common law and Civil law countries disregards: the ongoing 
influence of their pre-transplant law; the mixture and modification at the moment when some 
copying of foreign law occurs and; the post-transplant period (in which the transplanted law may 
be altered or applied differently from the origin country).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, we have examined global trajectories, dynamics and tendencies of software 
piracy to ease the benchmarking of current efforts towards harmonizing the standards and 
enforcements of IPRs protection worldwide. Our empirical exercise has been based on 15 
different panels, which together consists of 99 countries. The richness of the dataset has allowed 
us to disaggregate countries into fundamental characteristics of software piracy based on 
income-levels (high-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and low-income), 
legal-origins (English common-law, French civil-law, German civil-law and, Scandinavian civil-
law) and, regional proximity (South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & the Pacific, 
Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean and,  Sub-Saharan Africa). A 
generalized finding suggest that, a genuine timeframe for standardizing IPRs laws in the fight 
against software piracy is most likely on a horizon of 4.3 to 10.4 years. In other words, full 
(100%) convergence within the specified timeframe will mean the enforcements of IPRs regimes 
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without distinction of nationality or locality within identified fundamental characteristics of 
software piracy. The absence of convergence (in absolute and conditional terms) for the World 
panel indicates that, blanket policies may not be effective unless they are contingent on the 
prevailing trajectories, dynamics and tendencies of software piracy. Policy implications and 
caveats have been discussed. 
 
 
 
Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs 
       
Dependent 
Variable  
Software Piracy rate  0.272 0.456 -0.602 1.995 787 
       
 
First Set of 
Control Variables  
(Institutional, 
macroeconomic 
and ICT related) 
GDP per capita  3.998 0.456 0.000 4.919 872 
Research & Development (R & D) 1.050 0.955 0.000 4.811 481 
Internet Penetration  2.739 1.219 -1.000 5.606 842 
Personal Computer Users  2.989 0.846 0.000 5.455 813 
Population  7.054 0.750 0.000 9.125 890 
Rule of Law  0.341 0.953 -1.612 1.946 786 
Life Expectancy  1.854 0.049 1.623 1.916 788 
Finance   0.619 0.496 0.000 4.781 748 
       
 
Second Set of 
Control Variables 
(IPRs laws and 
treaties  related) 
Constitution 0.242 0.428 0.000 1.000 891 
Main IP Law 2.081 2.518 0.000 20.00 891 
IP Law 2.203 4.606 0.000 45.50 891 
WIPO Treaties  3.396 1.849 0.000 7.000 891 
Multilateral Treaties  10.41 5.803 0.000 25.00 891 
Bilateral Treaties  0.957 2.473 0.000 21.00 891 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Fundamental 
Characteristics  
High Income (HI) 0.443 0.497 0.000 1.000 891 
Upper Middle Income (UMI) 0.292 0.455 0.000 1.000 891 
Lower Middle Income (LMI) 0.241 0.428 0.000 1.000 891 
Low Income (LI) 0.020 0.140 0.000 1.000 891 
English Common Law (English) 0.272 0.445 0.000 1.000 891 
French Civil Law (French) 0.503 0.500 0.000 1.000 891 
German Civil Law (German) 0.181 0.385 0.000 1.000 891 
Scandinavian Civil Law (Scandi) 0.040 0.197 0.000 1.000 891 
South Asia (SA) 0.030 0.171 0.000 1.000 891 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 0.433 0.495 0.000 1.000 891 
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) 0.112 0.315 0.000 1.000 891 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 0.131 0.337 0.000 1.000 891 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 0.080 0.272 0.000 1.000 891 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 0.190 0.393 0.000 1.000 891 
      
 34 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,  Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala,  Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, UAE, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia.  
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. ICT: Information and Communication Technology.  Scandi: Scandinavian. Obs: 
Observations.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis      
                
Piracy 
rate 
Macroeconomic, institutional and ICT-related  control variables IPRs laws and treaties  related control variables  
GDP R & D Internet PC Pop. R.L Life E. Finance Const. MIPlaw IPrlaw WIPO Multi. Bilat.  
1.000 -0.663 -0.633 -0.512 -0.500 0.087 -0.737 -0.427 -0.431 0.138 -0.400 -0.104 -0.251 -0.460 -0.180 Piracy  
 1.000 0.598 0.371 0.421 -0.152 0.766 0.726 0.484 -0.077 0.289 0.063 0.183 0.321 0.115 GDP 
  1.000 0.436 0.508 0.062 0.679 0.485 0.373 -0.180 0.200 -0.040 0.068 0.343 0.185 R & D 
   1.000 0.839 0.468 0.278 0.317 0.271 0.012 0.351 0.216 0.335 0.392 0.250 Internet 
    1.000 0.640 0.334 0.342 0.293 0.069 0.356 0.236 0.286 0.395 0.281 PCs 
     1.000 -0.234 -0.209 -0.063 0.188 0.102 0.192 0.090 0.131 0.155 Pop. 
      1.000 0.588 0.520 -0.163 0.304 0.048 0.070 0.343 0.083 R.L 
       1.000 0.419 0.044 0.194 0.094 0.238 0.278 0.146 Life E. 
        1.000 -0.089 0.227 0.076 0.026 0.193 0.091 Finance 
         1.000 0.105 0.352 0.078 -0.061 0.161 Const. 
          1.000 0.548 0.328 0.324 0.020 MIPlaw 
           1.000 0.283 0.175 0.084 IPlaw 
            1.000 0.715 0.252 WIPO 
             1.000 0.172 Multi. 
              1.000 Bilat. 
                
GDP: GDP per capita. R&D: Research and Development. Internet: Internet penetration. PC: Personal Computer Users. Pop: Population. R.L: Rule of Law. Life E: Life Expectancy. 
Const: Constitution. MIPlaw: Main Intellectual Property Law. IPrlaw: Intellectual Property Rights Law. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization Treaties. Multi: Multilateral 
Treaties. Bilat: Bilateral Treaties.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Abbreviation Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
Piracy Piracy Logarithm of Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Growth per capita GDP Logarithm of GDP per Capita, PPP (international constant 
dollars, 2005) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Research and 
Development  
R & D Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet Penetration Internet Logarithm of Internet Users per 1000   GMID 
    
PC Users  PC Logarithm of PC Users per capita  GMID 
    
Population  Pop. Logarithm of Population  World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Rule of Law 
 
R.L 
Rule of Law(estimate): Captures perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Life Expectancy  Life E. Logarithm of Life Expectancy at birth (total years)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial Depth  Finance Monetary base plus savings, demand and time deposits (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Constitution  Const. Dummy variable: Copyright is mentioned in the 
constitution  
WIPO 
    
Main_IP_law MIPlaw Main Intellectual Property Law WIPO 
    
IP_rlaw IPlaw Intellectual Property Rights Law WIPO 
    
Wipotreaties WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization  WIPO 
    
Mutilateral Multi. Multilateral Treaties  WIPO 
    
Bilateral Bilat.  Bilateral  Treaties  WIPO 
    
WDI: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. BSA: Business Software Alliance. GMID: 
Global Market Information Database. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Log: Logarithm. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization.  
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